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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS - RECIPROCITY,
REAL AND POTENTIAL, AS A BASIS
FOR ATTACK
DOUGLAS V. RIGLER*

I.

THE CONGLOMERATE

MERGER PROBLEM

In 1950, concern over economic concentration stimulated congressional
revision of section 7 of the Clayton Act' in an attempt to tighten the legal
definition of an actionable merger. Twelve years later, the Supreme Court
in United States v. Brown Shoe Co.2 noted:
It is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress
saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of
competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency. [Moreover]
Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the
courts the power to brake this force at its outset and before it gathered
momentum.8
Nonetheless, as the Court recognized, the Clayton Act still applied only
to those mergers involving a "probable anticompetitive effect" 4 which had
to be proven with respect to particular product markets.
Independent of these traditional antitrust considerations there may
be philosophical questions as to the size which corporations should be
permitted to attain, the number of industries in which a single corporation
should be allowed to be a significant factor, and the concentration of
power in several product markets in the hands of one company's management. These questions, however, do not necessarily involve an intent
to preserve competition. In fact, there may be reasons to prevent such
consolidations of economic power which are more or less unrelated to the
prevention of monopoly.
There is some question as to whether the 1950 amendments to section 7 were ever truly effective in reducing the "rising tide of concentration." Indeed, regardless of any temporary slowdown, there seems to have
been a recent upsurge in the number of large mergers, particularly in
the field of conglomerate mergers. Numerous companies have expanded
their size tenfold primarily through mergers, and in certain concentrated
industries each and every company in the top 80 percent of the industry

0 Member of the District of Columbia and Maryland Bars. B.S., United States Naval
Academy, 1956; J.D., George Washington University, 1963.
115 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
2 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3Id. at 317-18.
4Id. at 323.
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has been absorbed. 5 In short, there has been a new wave of concentration
in which, "[m]erger activity has registered progressive increases since the
early 1950's and has reached record levels in the 1960's." 6
The accelerated trend toward concentration has not gone unnoticed
by the enforcement agencies which have had to decide whether the more
or less familiar tests of section 7 are applicable to inter-industry mergers
of major companies in situations where it is difficult to demonstrate immediate competitive effects. The enforcement agencies seem to have
accepted the challenge of attempting to utilize section 7 in its present
form to combat this increasing concentration. Assistant Attorney General
McLaren before the House Ways and Means Committee contended that
conglomerate mergers may present different threats to competition, thus
requiring a new type of analysis. In addition to analyzing and exposing
the competitive implications of conglomerate mergers, it was the Department of Justice's duty to:
[F]ashion appropriate antitrust standards to meet all threats to competition which that study discloses. This effort may require us to ask the courts
to adapt established theories to new circumstances, or to fashion new tests
to meet new needs, in order to insure that the objectives of the Congress
7
are achieved.
He also identified some of the anticompetitive effects he attributes to
conglomerate mergers, including (1) elimination of potential entrants;
(2) increased barriers to entry in a concentrated market or entrenchment
of a dominant firm's position; (3) creation of the opportunity to engage
in reciprocal dealing; (4) dilution of inter-industry competitive zeal for
fear of retaliation in different product areas by other inter-industry firms;
(5) reduction in the number of independent firms conducting research and
utilizing competitive innovation.
In a later speech, Mr. McLaren noted that current Department cases are
aimed at those combinations which do have distinguishable anticompetitive
effects, viz., reductions in potential competition, reciprocity, and interindustry relationships which reduce overall competitive levels. He stated that
Department enforcement efforts:
[R]epresent no radical departure from established law; such factors as the
elimination of potential competition, the creation of opportunities for
reciprocal dealing, the entrenchment of a leading firm in a concentrated
market, the triggering of additional mergers, all have been specifically
5 For example, in the car rental industry, Hertz, Avis and National were all acquired
by conglomerate concerns; likewise in the fertilizer industry, many independent producers
were bought by oil companies. BUREAU OF ECONOMIcS, FTC, ECONoMIc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 307-08 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
6Id. at 4.
7 Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 2390 (1969) (remarks of Assistant Att'y Gen. McLaren).
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recognized by the Supreme Court as grounds for enjoining mergers under
Section 7 ....

Subsequently, Attorney General Mitchell, however, indicated that the
Justice Department may very well oppose mergers among the top 200
manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size in other industries, and
mergers by one of the top 200 manufacturing firms with any leading
producer in any concentrated industry.9 He also stated that the Department
would continue to attack mergers which reduce potential competition or
develop a substantial potential for reciprocity.
The Justice Department has not been alone in its response to this
accelerated trend in concentration. In announcing a proposed complaint
against White Consolidated Industries Inc., the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) warned:
There is a vital connecting link between growing aggregate concentration
and the market power conferred by concentration in individual markets.
The resulting accumulation of oligopoly power in numerous markets may
result in the mutual entrenchment of unhealthy market situations and the

enhancement of the new combination's power to pursue anticompetitive
practices in any of its markets by selectively applying oligopoly power
against less powerful firms.10
Accordingly, although the antitrust agencies have expressed a willingness to test the boundaries of the present section 7, these tests to date seem
to have been conceived primarily in terms of reciprocity or potential
competition. Professor Donald F. Turner, former Chief of the Antitrust
Division, has expressed reservations as to whether section 7, in its present
form, proscribes mergers which demonstrably increase overall industrial
concentration but do not immediately affect competition within any
given industry. The problem, as the Department once viewed it, is the difficulty of establishing in satisfaction of the Act a reasonable likelihood of
a substantial lessening of competition, without reference to particular
anticompetitive consequences. The Turner Administration indicated that if
Congress is concerned about increased concentration even absent proof of
anticompetitive effect (a concern which the Department shared) the proper
remedy would be to amend the statute to prevent such mergers."
With this difference of opinion as to the scope of section 7, it
8 Address by Assistant Att'y Gen. McLaren, Town Hall, Los Angeles, California, May
27, 1969, in 5 TaDE RiE. REP. 50,244, at 55,500 (1969). He also stated that "foothold"
acquisitions by conglomerates in concentrated industries would be welcomed-a point to be
considered during the discussion of "reciprocity effect."
9 Address by Att'y Gen. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Association, Savannah, Georgia, June 6,

50,247 (1969).
1969, in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
18,688, at 21,059 (Mar. 6, 1969).
10 3 TRADE REG. REP.
11 See 1968 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. RE. 5642
(daily ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT]; 1969 WHITE
HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115 CONG. RE. 6350
(daily ed. June 16, 1969).
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will be useful to analyze the major cases brought during the last year to
test the boundaries of the Clayton Act. These cases include: United States
v. Ling-Temco-Vought, 12 United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc.18 and
three cases involving ITT-Hartford Insurance, 4 Grinnell,15 and Canteen. 16 In addition, the proposed FTC complaint against the White Consolidated Industries-Allis Chalmers merger should be examined together
with the private action filed by Allis Chalmers in opposition to White's
17
takeover attempt.
Significantly, each of these cases contains a charge that the merged
concerns will engage in reciprocal buying and selling programs to the
detriment of competition. Elimination of potential competition was cited
in the LTV case, in the Allis-Chalmers case, in Hartford and Northwest
Industries. An increase in aggregate concentration and the creation of
higher entry barriers to new competitors was cited in Northwest Industries,
in LTV, in Grinnell, and in the proposed FTC Allis-Chalmers complaint.
Certain of the more conventional theories involving horizontal or vertical
considerations were involved in Hartford, Northwest Industries, and AllisChalmers.
The more conventional offenses charged, if proven, should constitute an easy method of disposition in favor of Government. Even though
the product markets or geographic markets involved in these allegations
are minor when compared to the overall scope of the companies' activities,
the merger may be prohibited. Of course, to the extent that horizontal and
vertical problems are present in these large-scale mergers, they probably
can be eliminated by spin-offs or sales of assets; and the acquisition of
horizontal or vertical assets seems unlikely to have been a prime motivating
factor of the acquiring company in these cases. For purposes of this
discussion, therefore, it may be assumed that neither horizontal nor
vertical considerations constitute the primary basis of the government's
attack on the mergers and that the Government would consider these
mergers objectionable even absent these allegations.
II.

RECIPROCITY AS A BASIS FOR ATTACKING CONGLOMERATE MERGERS

Despite indications from the Attorney General that big companies'
moves into concentrated industries may be actionable in and of themselves
under section 7, the Justice Department thus far has chosen to battle principally on grounds of reciprocity and reciprocity effect. Attacking mergers
on grounds of reciprocity raises three interesting questions. The first con125 TRADE

RrE. REP.

45,069 (W.D. Pa. April 14, 1969).

13 Complaint, 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
14

United States ,v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).

15 Id.
16 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
45,069 (N.D.
Ill. April 28, 1969).
17 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.), rev'g
294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969).
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cerns the validity of utilizing any increase in reciprocity potential as a
ground for finding the probability of a substantial lessening of competition.
The second is whether reciprocity effect' s is or should be actionable, particularly as products become more fungible. 19 The question is whether some
irrelevant or irrational factor must necessarily be applied to purchase orders
of fungible, uniformly priced commodities. If some factor other than price
or quality must be utilized to select a supplier, then is the practice of favoring customers with orders a logical method of selection? The third question
is whether the propensity for reciprocal trading is influenced by the nature
of the products, specifically whether product fungibility is an important
factor.
1 and Section 7.
A. Reciprocity as an Antitrust Violation -Section
There is one major problem in the suggestion that the creation of an
opportunity for reciprocal dealing practices alone would violate section 7;
that is the fact that reciprocal dealing affecting interstate commerce constitutes an independent basis for attack under the antitrust laws. Thus, if
the practice of reciprocity is illegal, then enlargement of the opportunity to
engage in it should be of little consequence since, presumably, companies
will restrict themselves to lawful conduct.
By analogy, a merger between two companies, one of which substantially controls a scarce product, might allow the merged company to tie the
products of the other company to the product in which it enjoyed market
dominance. To do so, however, would violate section 3 of the Clayton Act
and section 1 of the Sherman Act. So long as these companies refrained
from what may be assumed to be illegal tying practices, however, there
might be no reduction in competition associated with the merger. The mere
possibility that the companies would wish to engage in an independently
illegal act would not constitute grounds for attacking the merger under
section 7, 2o Similarly, a greater potential for engaging in illegal reciprocity
practices should not constitute grounds for finding a section 7 violation.
It is true that unlike section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 7 of the
Clayton Act is designed to reach anticompetitive situations in their incipiency. To satisfy section 7 it is not necessary to wait until the violation is
full blown-conduct may be enjoined as soon as the probability of a
lessening of competition can be shown. But allegations that a new potential
18 Reciprocity effect differs from actual reciprocity which encompasses the knowing
utilization of purchase orders to promote sales. Reciprocity effect has been defined as "the
tendency of a firm desiring to sell to another company to channel its purchases to that
company." United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., April 14,
1969) (complaint filed).
19 Fungible produces are those which are essentially interchangeable regardless of
supplying source, being of nearly uniform physical characteristics, e.g., salt.
20 Likewise, a combination of buying power might give a merged company additional
leverage to induce price discriminating discounts from sellers in violation of section 5 of
the FTC Act. The presence of additional buying power and its use to induce discounts
are not however the same.
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for reciprocity exists seem more in the category of possibilities than probabilities. Something more than a greater number of products under one
corporate roof than were present prior to a merger is required to show a
probability. Recent complaints and decisions illustrate (and generally support) this proposition.
In several complaints, the Government has taken the position that
engaging in reciprocal trading practices violates the Sherman Act. In
theory, almost every large company has the capacity to direct some business
to its friends, but having the capacity and having an active program to
solicit sales on a reciprocal basis are not the same. Sherman Act complaints
have alleged active programs as in United States v. United States Steel
Corp.,21 filed in June 1969, and settled by consent judgment in August
1969. Pointing out that U. S. Steel's overall size gave it sufficient power to
induce would-be suppliers to purchase their steel requirements from defen,
dant, the Government charged that U. S. Steel violated section 1 by entering
into combinations involving reciprocal purchasing agreements and violated
section 2 by attempting through use of its purchasing power to monopolize
trade and commerce of potential supplier-customers for steel, cement, and
chemicals. According to the complaint, U. S. Steel compiled and coordinated
purchase and sales data and used this information to determine which suppliers to favor and the extent to which they should be favored, Company
personnel discussed sales and purchase positions with actual and potential
suppliers and made purchase contracts contingent on reciprocal buying
contracts.
The Department of Justice also has outstanding a complaint against
General Tire and Rubber Company- and its subsidiaries, charging Sherman
Act violations similar in nature to those attacked in the U. S. Steel complaint. General, it is charged, maintained a trade relations department and
tabulated purchases and sales so that an effective reciprocity program could
function. According to the complaint, the parent company and subsidiaries'
purchases of supplies amount to approximately $500 million.
The FTC has taken a position parallel to that of the Department of
Justice. For example, American Standard, a major plumbing fixtures firm,
and GAF (formerly General Aniline and Film), a large chemical company,
each recently consented with the FTC to abandon reciprocal trading plans
similar to the plan employed by U. S. Steel.
According to the FTC, American Standard is a company large enough
to affect other companies' buying choices by use of economic force unrelated
to product superiority. Its 1968 sales were $1.075 billion, and within its
highly concentrated industry (top four manufacturers accounted for more
than 75 percent of total value output) American was one of the leaders.
American established a commercial relations department which utilized a
215 TRADE REG. REP. 45,069, at 52,720 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 1969).
22 United States v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
643 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 1967).

45,067, at 52,
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choice of designated bank depositories for withholding taxes as a method
of influencing banks to specify American Standard fixtures and to encourage
bank customers to do the same. 23
GAF had 1968 sales of $570 million and it, too, had an active program
designed to press reciprocal trading on its suppliers. Trading partners were
assigned percentage allocations for specific materials, and in some cases
minimum dollar volumes were designated to be protected against a decline
in requirements. Sometimes GAF held "symposiums" with other companies,
discussing reciprocal possibilities, and, on other occasions, "review" sessions
24
were held.
These cases make abundantly clear the Government's contention that
the foreclosure of a market to competitors through the use of reciprocity
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. By contrast, United States v.
GeneralDynamics Corp.,25 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,26 and United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 27 were brought under section 7, and in each
the court found that the companies had deliberately arranged to benefit
from the merger under a planned program of reciprocal buying. In General
Dynamics a new Special Sales Program was instituted within months after
the acquisition. This program was further refined to categorize some 350
companies, each selling $250,000 of goods or services to General Dynamics,
into a "National Accounts System." Moreover, this group consisted of accounts where final purchasing authority was concentrated at a central headquarters location.
Whether an increased opportunity for reciprocity is actionable under
section 7 was presented but not resolved in Consolidated Foods. The Supreme Court relied upon post-acquisition evidence that reciprocity had
been practiced (although there was debate as to how successful the attempts
at reciprocal trading had proven). This finding left it unclear whether a
charge that there was a probable anticompetitive effect merely by the
merger of the two companies would have been sustained. The Court stated
at one point, "We hold at the outset that the 'reciprocity' made possible by
such an acquisition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at
which the antitrust laws are aimed," 28 but the use of the word reciprocity
might be taken to include the reciprocal practices which appeared in the
post-acquisition evidence. On the other hand, there were references to the
"power to foreclose competition from a substantial share of the markets,"29
and notice was taken of the FTC's finding that "merely as a result of its
connection with Consolidated, and without any action of the latter's part,
Gentry would have an unfair advantage over competitors enabling it to
FTC REPORT 354 passim.
Id. at 373 passim.
25258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
27 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.), aff'g 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
28 380 US. at 594.
23

24

29

Id. at 593.
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make sales that otherwise might not have been made."3 0 This suggests that
an increased ability to practice reciprocity might be actionable.
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, concluded, however, that "[c]learly
the opportunity for reciprocity is not alone enough to invalidate a merger
under Section 7" and "[i]t obviously requires more than this kind of bare
potential for reciprocal buying to bring a merger within the ban of Section
7."31 The Stewart view supports the conclusion that there must be some
overt act indicating that reciprocity is a distinct threat or real possibility.
The Ingersoll-Rand case terminated after the Government was successful in its application for a preliminary injunction. Among the grounds
pressed in support of the motion was an opportunity to make reciprocal
sales. One of the difficulties of Ingersoll-Rand is that there was no evidence
that reciprocity had been practiced or that there was an intent to do so.
Of course, the court was required to find only a reasonable probability of
success on the part of the Government. Also, the court's ruling was not
couched solely in terms of the reciprocity issue. Accordingly, whether an
increased opportunity to practice reciprocity alone would have violated
32
section 7 was never finally resolved.
The new attack on conglomerate mergers, however, adds the dimension
of reciprocity effect which, as we have seen, was not basic to the prior
decisions. 33 In the LTV-J & L Steel complaint 34 the Department stated that
competition would be lessened in the following ways: (a) potential competition would be reduced in the steel industry and in other markets; (b) the
power of LTV and J & L Steel, and of their suppliers, to employ and to
benefit from reciprocity and reciprocity effects in the sale of their products
will be substantially enhanced; (c) concentration of control of manufacturing assets will be substantially increased and the trend to further concentration by merger will be encouraged.35 Most pertinent to this discussion is
the allegation that J 8c L Steel has actively engaged in reciprocity for
many years. If this allegation can be proven, then it is difficult to understand why J & L should not have been the subject of a complaint similar
in scope and nature to the one filed against U. S. Steel.
30 Id.

at 597.

31 Id. at 603.

32 Note that Justice Stewart's concurrence in Consolidated Foods was written after the
Ingersoll-Rand decision.
33 Cf. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
34 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., April 14,
1969) (complaint filed).
35 The effects of (c) are further alleged to be: (1) a reduction in the number of firms
capable of entering concentrated markets, (2) a reduction in the number of firms with
the capability and incentive for competitive invasion, (3) an increased barrier to entry
in concentrated markets, (4) diminishing of the vigor of competition by increasing actual
and potential customer-supplier relationships among leading firms in concentrated markets.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these interesting contentions. As noted
earlier, the Government seems to be relying principally on reciprocity theories in its
new conglomerate cases, notwithstanding the allegations relating to concentration of
control. Id.
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The LTV case emphasizes a possibly significant shift in emphasis
between the unilateral reciprocity program cases and the LTV, ITT, and
Northwest Industries series of complaints
the ones charging a violation
of section 7. In the former cases charging a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, it was reciprocity itself that was attacked. In the merger cases
reciprocity is attacked, and in addition, power to employ "reciprocity
effect" is attacked. Reciprocity and reciprocity effect were defined in all
of the section 7 complaints in language identical to that of the LTV
86
complaint.
The Northwest Industries complaint, however, identified specific markets in which opportunities for reciprocity existed and in which reciprocity
effect was likely to occur. For example, it was alleged that reciprocity is a
factor significantly influencing routing decisions of large shippers by rail
and that Northwest might benefit by reason of Goodrich's purchasing power.
Also, Goodrich's sales of tires may benefit by reason of Northwest's substantial purchases of railroad equipment and petroleum products from companies which buy tires.
Denying the government's request for a preliminary injunction, the
court balanced actual evidence of a history of reciprocity against a statement
by Northwest's chief executive that the company has a policy against reciprocal dealing, considers such a practice uneconomic, and has no machinery
for effectuating that practice. In its findings of fact the court concluded
that the potential for the practice of reciprocity would be increased but
that the extent to which actual reciprocity would be practiced and "therefore, the probable actual anti-competitive effect thereof is, on the basis of
37
the present record, difficult if not impossible to forecast."
One very interesting aspect of Northwest Industries was the court's
receipt of evidence indicating that many customers and suppliers, including
several leading companies in highly concentrated industries, of both Goodrich and Northwest practice reciprocity, thus highlighting the difference
between actual reciprocity and the potential reciprocity challenged in the
38
complaint.
In the ITT complaints, 39 the power to employ reciprocity or benefit
from reciprocity effect has played a prominent role. In the Canteen case,
it also was alleged that the acquisition would reduce actual and potential
competition for vending business at industrial locations, raise entry barriers,
and tend to trigger other mergers by competitors of Canteen seeking to
For the definition of "reciprocity effect," see note 18 supra.
301 F. Supp. at 1095.
38 One sidelight to this evidence was the fact that certain large companies which
allegedly practice reciprocity may not insist upon reciprocal trading unless the amounts
involved reach certain minimum figures. This suggests that unless large sums are involved,
reciprocity is uneconomic. If such is the case, the Government's burden of showing the
actual anticompetitive effect of "reciprocity effect" should be maintained. See Part II-B1
36

37

infra.
39

See notes 14-16 supra.
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protect themselves from the impact of the acquisition. In Hartford and
Grinnell, the Government emphasized reciprocity, not only in the complaint, but also in its arguments for a preliminary injunction. The motion
was denied, and an important factor in the court's decision was its finding
that ITT correctly represented that it did not have a trade relations department, that it did not solicit business on a reciprocal basis, and that its
method of management encompassed a series of separate profit centers, each
striving to maximize the unit's individual profit without particular regard
to the effect on other company units.
Not only would the profit center approach militate against reciprocity,
but there was testimony that the compensation and promotion of the individuals who manage each profit center is determined by the performance of
their own profit center, not the performance of ITT as a whole. Insofar as
management would thus be working against its own personal interest, it
would appear that this may well be the strongest single factor underlying
the rejection of a reciprocal trading posture. A second strong piece of evidence was the fact that ITT did not collect the purchasing and sales data
incidental to reciprocal purchasing opportunities. 40 The court also favored
ITT's argument that suppliers who purchased ITT products in the hopes
of being rewarded with additional supply contracts would soon abandon
that practice when they found that ITT was not equipped to render such
41
favors.
An issue which may receive further exploration at the trial stage of
the ITT proceedings is the extent to which top management is prepared
to override unit managers, the profit center approach notwithstanding, in
order to increase overall company profits. There may be times when a management-coordinating committee might want to insist that a particular unit
favor another even though the purchasing unit's income statement may
appear to be reduced.
It is plain that the Department of Justice is making good its promise
to test the boundaries of section 7, at least in terms of reciprocity. The issues
40 A third piece of evidence upon which the court relied was ITT's written policy
against reciprocity which had been disseminated to purchasing and sales personnel. The
weight to be given this evidence obviously is related to the sincerity with which the policy
was drafted and disseminated. Evidence of this type is particularly susceptible to selfserving purposes. The denial of access to purchasing and sales data, however, deprives
would-be reciprocal traders from the essential tools necessary for their task.
41Without reference to the full trial transcript certain other points cited or relied
upon by the court as evidence that no reciprocity program was contemplated by ITT
seemed weak. For example, the court noted that defendants adduced considerable evidence
that ITT's major suppliers have non-reciprocity policies and in fact do not practice
reciprocity (in purchasing insurance). Once again, proof that a supplier has a nonreciprocity policy seems subject to self-serving manufacturing of evidence. This is
especially true if the contention that reciprocity practiced independently of a merger is
itself illegal is accepted. Moreover, the fact that a defendant requests its major suppliers
to make such statements might reduce the statements' value since supply contractors
would be subject to reallocation as much out of disfavor should the supplier not testify
as requested by reciprocal trading considerations.
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of potential for reciprocity and reciprocity effect were perhaps just around
the corner in Consolidated Foods and Ingersoll-Rand. The new complaints
the Department may
show that their importance has been enlarged -but
use
the new potential,
intent
to
of
an
some
evidence
it
has
find that unless
this ground.
on
mergers
conglomerate
foreclose
able
to
not
be
it will
B. Should Reciprocity Effect be Actionable?
In attacking reciprocity effect the Government seems concerned with
the proposition that certain mergers will lead to certain trading patterns.
At the same time, the Antitrust Division seems aware that there are differences between systematic trade relations programs and nonstructural
42
reciprocal dealing arrangements.
The problem is one of finding that mutual trading by preference, rather
than agreement, violates the antitrust laws. In recent Department cases,
such as United States Steel, there have been allegations that trading partners
have been pressured into making choices they might not otherwise have
made. In order for this persuasion to work, however, some sort of policing
system must be in effect. Either tabulations must be kept so that a company
wishing to practice reciprocity can establish quotas and keep score, or an
active trade relations department must be maintained in which executives
from one company continually remind purchasing agents from the other
company that each company can guarantee sales for a mutual trading program. In most instances, the Government has been able to show the existence
of both a trade relations department and a tabulation program.
If there is no active program to encourage reciprocal trading, however,
but the same reciprocal trading patterns emerge, is there a section 1 violation? Does it require some affirmative act to violate section 1? And with
respect to section 2, except in the most extreme cases of market concentration,
how is the Government to show that the trading pattern is not the result of
quality or service preferences? Suppose, for example, U.S. Steel's trading
patterns are not appreciably altered by the abandonment of its trade relations program.
Another problem in assessing the impact of reciprocity effect on competition is the lack of economic information on the subject. In strict empirical terms there is no way of measuring the success of a trade relations
program. One might see its pernicious effect more clearly in cases such as
General Dynamics and in the evidence cited in the FTC Staff Report with
respect to American Standard. In those cases, clearly external factors shifted
business away from competitors although they might have had product
42 After all of the smoke has cleared, it becomes rather clear to me that the
overriding issue today is really not whether coercive reciprocity or mutual
patronage agreements violate the Sherman Act, but whether and to what extent
there is in practice a difference between a systematic trade relations program,
on the one hand, and reciprocal dealing arrangements, on the other hand.
Address by Director Rashid, Antitrust Division Operations, Sept. 4, 1969, in 5 TMADE RE.
50,256, at 55,537 (1969).
RiEP.
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superiority, better price, or better service. In Hartford and Grinnell, however, ITT maintained that reciprocity effect would be lost when suppliers
realized that ITT would not play tile reciprocity game.
Another unanswered question is whether non-coercive reciprocity is
anticompetitive. When dealing with fungibles, some external factor is necessary in determining which source is to receive a purchase order. The argument against reciprocity has sometimes been stated in terms that reciprocity
induces an irrational or alien factor into the selection process for goods
which would not be present if perfect competition existed.43 The difficulty
is that in a perfectly competitive situation -a
situation which does not
exist but which within our economy is more closely approached in terms of
fungible basic products-some such irrational factor must be present in
the selective process. If we eliminate reciprocity, a selection could be made
using factors such as whose father-in-law worked for which company, the
political stance of company executives, etc.; but some competitively irrational factor would have to come into play.
Two factors suggesting that companies will tend to select their own
customers as suppliers, where economically possible, are desire to protect
against labor problems and shortages. In times when products are in short
supply, either because of strikes or shortages, companies will seek inducements to foster favorable delivery schedules. A history of reciprocal
trading can be influential in establishing delivery preferences.
If the necessity of "irrational factors" is conceded in determining supplier selection, and if the reasonability of reference to mutual trading patterns is admitted, then it would seem that non-coercive reciprocity or
reciprocity not by agreement sometimes plays a useful role. If the Government were to quarrel with these assumptions, then in the case of extremely
large and economically powerful companies, such as U.S. Steel, the Government would be in the position of outlawing mutual trading without regard
to the existence of a conscious program based upon reciprocity. Stated differently, the Government's concern with reciprocity effect should apply to
all concentrated industries if reciprocity effect has some pernicious effect
upon competition. If the Government is not willing to go this far, however,
then a merger which arguably would increase the possibility of reciprocity
effect perhaps, should not be judged by different standards. 44 Unfortunately,
if the Government attacks reciprocity effect based on industry position then
selling to one's supplier becomes suspect under the antitrust laws. Yet the
law should not produce a result where a company consciously avoids selling
to its supplier. Such a result is plainly anticompetitive.
43 FTC REPORT 328.
•44
Of course, the issue of whether it is fair to attack lesser concentrations of market
power within an industry caused by mergers when established companies with a greater
degree of market power are permitted to maintain their position, has been a source of
comment for many years. See NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT.
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C. Is Product Fungibility a Factor in Assessing Probability of Reciprocity?
An issue related to both reciprocity and reciprocity effect is whether
either is limited in its practice by the confines of the market structure. The
subject was touched upon in ITT where the court noted that an essential
prerequisite to reciprocal dealing is an oligopolistic or concentrated market
with dull price competition. 45 The government's economist, Dr. Mueller
(who also was the chief architect of the FTC Economic Report On Corporate
Mergers), testified that the product must be reasonably interchangeable with
competitive products, i.e., "more or less homogeneous - or when it is differentiated, then these differences can be translated into price and cost differences." '46 This suggests a rule of comparative fungibility. The more fungible
the product which is being supplied, the more likely its price will be uniform
throughout the market and the more probable it is that buying decisions
will turn on some factor other than price. In these instances a company
willing to utilize reciprocity might find the opportunities enhanced. Conversely, the more unique the product or the more it is designed especially
for some purpose, the less likely it is that reciprocity can be applied. For
example, in ITT-Hartford, part of the argument turned upon whether insurance and insurance coverage are essentially interchangeable so that any
number of insurers can provide acceptable service or whether coverage varies
with respect to cost and service.
An interesting commentary on this point is found in the FTC merger
study section dealing with the General Tire complaint.47 Apparently, General Tire was willing to "purchase" reciprocal orders by increasing the business it gave to J & L Steel. Some of the exhibits noted that a special type
of giant tire used for mining equipment was unacceptable to J & L because
General's tires had no durability. As a matter of fact, there were specific
complaints of the substandard performance of General's tires. Despite these
complaints General was able to secure an order for six tires at a value of
$13,000 after the trade relations director became active. The record is silent
as to the profit margin on this sale, but considering the amount of correspondence which apparently went into the sale, the personal involvement of
the trade relations director of General Tire, the involvement of other
executives, and the small size of the order, one might question whether
such a reciprocal trading program would not prove more costly to General
in the long run. Notwithstanding this example - or taking it into account
- it would seem that reciprocity either is wasted because it is too costly or
it is ineffective as a means of increasing sales of non-fungible items.
The FTC Report describes this as the "all other things being equal
argument"; and the economic staff took the position that all other things
seldom, if ever, are equal. 48 The Report's examples supporting this point
45
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46 Id. at 781-82.
47 FTC REPORT
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seem isolated, however, and as noted above, indicate that the company made
a poor choice in insisting upon reciprocal buying of non-fungible items. It
would appear that there may be a large degree of equality in dealing with
easily identifiable fungible items, such as, bushels of wheat, steel or aluminum ingots, basic chemicals, or petroleum products.
By contrast, in the Allis-Chalmers complaint and in the private action
injunction suit, much was made of the enhanced opportunity for reciprocity
which would arise when White, a substantial purchaser of steel, acquired
a company owning Blaw Knox, one of the few producers of steel rolling mill
machinery. Here the rule of comparative fungibility would seem to operate
against the reciprocal buying argument. A steel company making a sizeable
capital investment in a machine to be depreciated over a period of years
and one which would have a substantial effect upon overall plant efficiency
should not be affected by reciprocal trading pressure. The cost of securing
White Industries' steel orders should prove too high, provided a Blaw Knox
competitor had a machine with better performance. This assumes that steel
rolling mill machines are not identical, that they vary in cost, in performance
specifications, in economy, in durability, and in maintenance-free operation.
The American Standard situation illustrates the importance of fungibility to successful reciprocity as well as any of the situations thus far
considered. American utilized for its reciprocity program a choice of approved depository banks for withholding tax deposits, a decision ostensibly
non-competitive in nature. The banks, however, due to the very nature of
this choice exercised by American, were peculiarly susceptible to reciprocity
pressures. They were "buying" immediate assets and since these assets
could only be profitable - there was no downside risk in making the "purchases" - they were easy targets for an active trade relation department.
Another factor rendering certain products non-fungible would be the
ownership of patents which would cause various products (especially
machinery) to differ. To the extent that a supplier offers a patented product,
chances increase that the purchasing company will not be able to insist upon
reciprocal purchases. A case illustrating this point, but one in which the
court seemed to be proceeding toward an erroneous conclusion or at least
an unprovable conclusion, was Ingersoll-Rand. As noted, the case terminated at the preliminary injunction stage, and the court's findings with
respect to reciprocity or potential reciprocity were tentative in nature. The
potential reciprocity which was of concern to the court, involved coal mining machinery and equipment, particularly a machine known as a continuous miner. 49 The court theorized that Ingersoll, a large machinery
manufacturer, also purchased substantial quantities of steel. Steel companies
were large customers of the coal industry, and continuous miners and other
49 The decision that the Government had showed a substantial probability of success
also was based on the court's finding that the "deep pocket" theory applied and that
Ingersoll's resources would give the three companies to be acquired competitive advantages
over their smaller unintegrated rivals.
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coal machinery were manufactured by the companies Ingersoll wished to
acquire. Coal companies wishing to sell to steel companies which in turn
wished to sell steel to Ingersoll were to favor Ingersoll in purchasing mine
equipment, including continuous miners.5 0
In view of some of the court's findings, it just does not seem probable
that reciprocity would have played a part in purchase orders for continuous
miners. There was evidence that the price of continuous miners varied
between $85,000 and $250,000 and that the machines varied by weight, by
size, and by the size of the coal seam they were capable of mining. Only
six companies manufactured these machines, and Lee-Norse, one of the
companies Ingersoll wished to acquire, held the number one position. Its
machine had extensive patent coverage. This machine had enabled LeeNorse and Goodman (another acquisition partner) to increase its market
share from 42.5 percent in 1958 to 60.1 percent in 1961. Industry shipments
of continuous coal miners reached a dollar value of only $10 million. It
seems apparent, therefore, that a coal mining company would be concerned
with factors other than reciprocity in the selection of a continuous mining
machine. The court's suggestion that the judicious use of steel purchasing
power could measurably increase the acquired companies' sales of machinery
and equipment implies that the coal companies, because of the reciprocity
factor, would make poor economic decisions with respect to the operation of
their plant.
Moreover, the reciprocity which the court feared would occur was
second-line reciprocity - that is, Ingersoll could not directly affect the
machinery buying choices of the coal companies. It would have to pressure
a steel company to pressure one of its suppliers. The court stressed that
the steel industry would have to rely upon coal for several years to come,
but this infers that coal may have been in short supply. The record is not
complete on this point - the coal industry apparently had reversed some
decline in demand- but if it is assumed that supply and demand of coal
for steel industry purposes are approximately in balance or that coal is in
short supply, then the steel companies would be unable to exercise any
leverage against their coal company suppliers even if they were of a mind
to do so. To facilitate such a reciprocity program Ingersoll would have to
implement an actual program to correlate potential customers for coal
mining machinery with coal companies selling steel to potential Ingersoll
suppliers. Finally, a buyers' market for steel is assumed, a factual area not
covered by the court's opinion.
It appears that the cases thus far decided have not focused sufficiently
on the role of product fungibility on a successful reciprocal trading scheme.
50 Mention was made of steel companies with "captive" mines, but no findings of
fact were made as to the importance of such mines.
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CONCLUSIONS

In view of the pressure on management, especially management of conglomerate companies, to increase profits, it seems likely that the Government
frequently will be able to find evidence of intent to benefit from reciprocity.
As long as some conscious use of reciprocity is contemplated, a merger is
vulnerable to section 7 attack. However, allowing government prohibition
of a merger solely on a showing that the merged companies will have a
greater arsenal of products to sell to actual or potential suppliers appears
beyond the bounds of section 7. To hold that an increased potential for
reciprocity alone violates section 7 would have the practical effect of
relieving the Government of the burden of showing the probability of a
substantial lessening of competition with respect to particular product
markets. Certainly, economic evidence thus far available does not warrant
such a result.
The presumption that merger partners will wish to engage in reciprocity
should be closely examined where products are non-fungible, since prospective leverage over such products may be difficult to establish. Again, the
burden of proof should be on the Government to demonstrate why trading
partners would make uneconomic choices in the selection of differentiable
products.
As products grow more fungible, the temptation to engage in reciprocity
will increase, and in these instances a company's disavowal of the intent to
utilize reciprocity may warrant even closer examination. At the same time,
as fungibility increases, reliance upon some external factor, such as mutual
trading relationships, becomes more necessary. This problem is related to
already existing patterns of mutual trading in concentrated industries even
where no active reciprocity program exists. If we are concerned with whether
section 7 should be amended in order to address itself directly to increased
concentration without immediately demonstrable anticompetitive effects,
then perhaps the question of mutual trading patterns in concentrated industries should be considered in depth at the same time.

